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New York,
16/02/2007
(SPS) Polisario Front presented on Wednesday a memorandum to the UN
Security Council in which it rejects the Moroccan autonomy plan,
estimating that it is "unilateral, illegal and anti-democratic".
It also noted that it is very far from been a «political solution,
mutually acceptable that provides for the Saharawi people’s right to
self-determination», which the international community recommended.
Here is the complete text of the document of which SPS received a
copy:
“
MEMORANDUM BY THE Fente POLISARIO ON
THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA
1.
-
The 61st Session of the General Assembly has just adopted a
resolution that reaffirms the right of Western Sahara to
self-determination. This is the 41st consecutive year in which the
international community declares solemnly that the decolonization
conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front can
be resolved only by allowing the Saharawi people to exercise their
right to self-determination.
Listed as a non self-governing territory by the United Nations
Special Committee on Decolonization since 1965, Western Sahara is
subject to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) entitled Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.
For its part, the Security Council has constantly stressed the need
to find a just and final solution that guarantees self-determination
to the people of Western Sahara, and has reaffirmed in resolution
1720 its commitment to achieve a mutually acceptable political
solution which will provide for the self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara.
2.
-
It is worth mentioning on the other hand, that the International
Court of Justice, upon a request made by the United Nations General
Assembly, and an initiative by Morocco and Mauritania, issued a
legal opinion on 16 October 1975 in which it clearly established
that “The materials and information presented to it do not establish
any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus
the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might
affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in
the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.”
3.
-
Similarly, the opinion rendered by the Legal Counsel of the United
Nations, at the request of the Security Council, on 29 January 2002,
concluded clearly that Morocco had no administrative power on the
territory, that the 1975 Madrid Accords which divided the territory
between Morocco and Mauritania did not transfer to the signatories
any sovereignty whatsoever, and that finally the status of Western
Sahara as a non self-governing territory had not been affected by
those accords.
In sum, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the ICJ, and the
Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations did clearly identify
the question of Western Sahara as a question of decolonization whose
settlement should take into account the free and sovereign
expression of the people of the territory.
4.
-
It is thus only natural for the efforts aiming at solving the
question of
Western Sahara,
to have as ultimate objective to grant the people of that territory
the opportunity to decide their future by organizing a free and fair
referendum on self-determination.
The Settlement Plan approved by both parties to the conflict,
Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, and by the Security Council in its
resolutions 658 (1990) and 690 (1991), reflects this will. It
stipulates the entry into force of a ceasefire that paves the way
for organizing a free and regular referendum on self-determination
without any administrative or military constraints, for the Saharawi
identified in the 1974 Spanish census.
The delaying tactics, renunciations, and sudden changes of position
by Morocco have however resulted in undermining the Plan, similarly
to what they have done to the Houston Agreements that have been
negotiated and signed by both parties in September 1997 under the
auspices of Mr. James Baker III, the Personal Envoy of the
Secretary-General, and that permitted to resolve pending problems
and set the stage for organizing the referendum on 8 December 1998.
Today, the Plan can be, at any time, put back on track and
implemented if Morocco has the will to do so. In fact, all the
practical and painstakingly-negotiated modalities related to the
identification, cantonment of forces, repatriation of refugees and
organization of the referendum campaign, have been agreed upon and
the provisional list of voters has been duly approved by the United
Nations Identification Commission (IDC).
The other plan entitled the Peace Plan for Self-determination of the
People of Western Sahara, put forward by Mr. James Baker, at the
request of the Security Council following Morocco's rejection of the
settlement Plan, and approved by Security council resolution 1495
(2003), follows the same approach of the Settlement plan. Indeed, it
calls for the organization of a referendum, after a
four-to-five-year period of internal self-governance, for Saharawi
as well as Moroccans who have been residing in the territory in
December 1999.
Furthermore, although the referendum offered two options, i.e.
integration or independence, Mr. Baker added a third option –
self-governance within Moroccan sovereignty - in order to further
assure the Kingdom of Morocco, as an incentive to accept his plan.
However, this effort was exerted in vain because Morocco rejected
the Peace Plan as it had already done with the Houston Agreements
and the Settlement Plan that it approved and signed.
5.-
While
the rejection of a plan that includes all the conditions set by and
guarantees asked for by Morocco might apparently look surprising, it
should not be as surprising when we realize that this country
accepted the principle of organizing a referendum on
self-determination only after being forced to do so, and that since
the very beginning, and at the risk of reneging on its engagements,
it developed a strategy to undermine holding the referendum by
hindering, questioning and, currently, by denying altogether what
lies at the heart of the exercise of the right to self-determination
; the constituency who would take part in such exercise, and
ultimately the very existence of the Saharawi people.
Once the Settlement Plan had been approved, Morocco, as already
mentioned, embarked on a relentless campaign to undermine the
efforts of the IDC to establish the list of Saharawi voters, by
constantly questioning the identification criteria of voters,
intimidating the members of the Commission, and submitting multiple
appeals. Eventually it was able to paralyze the IDC activities.
It took all the ingenuity of Mr. Baker in order to put back on
track, through the Houston Accords, the identification operations,
and all the dedication and determination of the identification
Commission members to conclude its work and publish the provisional
list of voters by the end of 1999.
Once the referendum became unavoidable after meeting all the
conditions to organize it, Morocco arbitrary declared the settlement
inapplicable.
Instead of forcing Morocco to honor its engagements, the Security
Council requested Mr. Baker to find a political settlement that
provides self-determination for the people of Western Sahara.
Thinking that the reason for Morocco’s rejection of the Settlement
Plan and the referendum included, was its concern that the Saharawi
electorate would overwhelmingly vote in favour of independence, Mr.
Baker suggested in his Peace Plan for self-determination of the
people of Western Sahara the enlargement of the participating
electorate in the referendum called for by his plan, to include
Moroccans residing in Western Sahara until 31 December 1999.
To the surprise of Mr. Baker,
Morocco
rejected his plan under the pretext that the referendum included the
option for independence.
The United Nations Secretary-General, as well as Mr. Baker and his
successor Mr. Peter Van Walsum underlined to the Security Council
that it was inconceivable for a referendum on self-determination
organized by the United Nations not to include the option of
independence. Nonetheless, Morocco maintained its rejection of the
plan.
Coming back to the reasons for Morocco’s rejection of the various
United Nations plans, Mr. Baker said, in August 2004 on PBS, that
Morocco became more and more nervous every time they got closer to
holding a referendum on independence (called for by the Settlement
Plan): “the closer we got, the more nervous I think the Moroccans
got about whether they might not win the referendum”. And that
explains why “after the voter list has been made, the voters had
been identified, she (Morocco) said well, it’s no longer
applicable”, he said.
Mr. Baker was surprised of the fact that Morocco exhibited the same
nervousness about the results of the referendum called for by his
Peace Plan that was unanimously adopted by the Security Council in
July 2003, even though it was open to Moroccan residents that
largely outnumbered the Saharawi voters. “We have said we will
include all the people of Western Sahara as voters in the referendum
on self-determination. And, the Moroccans are evidently even afraid
of that”, he noted.
In fact, the reason for
Morocco’s
reneging on its international engagements is the fact that it knows
only too well that Western Sahara is not Moroccan and that it might
lose it if a referendum on self-determination was to be held even
with the participation of Moroccan citizens residing in Western
Sahara.
In sum, the Moroccan strategy has so far achieved its objectives as
long as Morocco was able to prevent the organization of the
referendum on self-determination called for by the international
organizations.
Yet the problem of Western Sahara is still on the agenda of the
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and the right
of the people of
Western Sahara
to self-determination is more relevant than ever since it has been
solemnly reiterated by the Security Council and the General Assembly
in October and December 2006.
Furthermore, no State has to date recognized any Moroccan
sovereignty on this territory which is considered by the United
Nations a non self-governing territory, subject to the
implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), as reiterated by Mr. Baker
in the same interview on PBS.
It is worth mentioning that in its report dated 8 September 2006,
the mission of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Western
Sahara recommended the following: “As it has been stated in various
UN fora, the right to self-determination for the people of Western
Sahara must be ensured and implemented without any further delay.”
6.
-
Since its rejection of the Baker plan in 2004, Morocco has never
stopped declaring time and again that it was willing to accept a
solution to the question of Western Sahara only “within the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Morocco” and that it was on
the verge of announcing a project of self-governance for that
territory in line with that unilaterally proclaimed principle.
Presented as a major concession, that project which puts aside all
the achievements made so far by the United Nations to settle the
conflict, is considered, in fact, another delaying tactic by Morocco
since its only purpose is to gain the recognition by the
international community of the fait-accompli or, in other words, of
the Moroccan sovereignty on a non self-governing territory without
meeting the requirements of the United Nations doctrine and practice
with regard to decolonization.
Thus, Morocco is counting on “the elapse of time” to make the
Saharawi people and the world accept its illegal occupation of a
territory on which the ICJ has clearly established that it does not
exercise any sovereignty.
Nonetheless, the Moroccan project is bound to fail for it is founded
on wrong principles, proposes an unacceptable and dangerous
solution, and puts an end to the national aspirations of a whole
people.
In fact, the basic principle according to which Western Sahara is
considered a Moroccan province is wrong since, from the
international legitimacy’s point of view,
Morocco
does not exercise territorial sovereignty or even administrative
authority over it. It is considered a non self-governing territory
whose status must be decided by its original residents.
In addition, by declaring that self-governance is the only solution,
Morocco is prejudging the will of the Saharawi people by limiting
their choice, from the start, to autonomy thus violating the
sacrosanct principle applicable to non self-governing territories as
enshrined by resolution 1514 (XV) and the doctrine and practice of
the United Nations with regard to decolonization, i.e. the principle
of self-determination that requires the concerned populations to
express their will through a free and regular referendum that
necessarily includes the option for independence.
Furthermore, this approach deliberately ignores the Saharawi
national reality with all its accomplishments and implications as
well as the strong wish for independence that has been manifested
daily for the last thirty years in the occupied Saharawi territories.
That project is also dangerous. In fact, willing to impose an
autonomy-based solution on a people who are fundamentally hostile to
any form of Moroccan trusteeship and who have fought the Moroccan
occupation for thirty years, is taking deliberately the risk to
increase the tension and create an intolerable situation that would
jeopardize the stability of the territory and the region and
undermine the chances for a just and final settlement of the
conflict.
Finally, Western Sahara is not a territory that lacks autonomy.
Rather, it is a territory that lacks sovereignty.
The problem could not therefore be resolved by granting autonomy, no
matter how wide-scoped it might be, but only by the free choice of
its original residents who would freely decide whether they want the
territory for themselves to make an independent State out of it, or
whether they are willing to be integrated in the Kingdom of Morocco
and be a province in that country.
Therefore, promoting autonomy is not the solution. For all those
reasons, the Moroccan project that has been time and again announced
and put off is not viable and is still-born.
7-
.
Finding a just and final settlement that respects the international
legitimacy for the problem of
Western Sahara today is not only necessary but possible.
Finding a settlement is still possible because the Settlement Plan
as well as the Peace Plan for self-determination of the people of
Western Sahara can provide, at any moment, if the political will
exists, an appropriate and honorable framework to settle the
conflict.
What other solution could be more just, more legitimate, more
democratic and more acceptable than the one that respects the will
of the population of the territory and fulfills the requirements of
the international law and the relevant resolutions of the United
Nations
?
The settlement is necessary because the Kingdom of Morocco, the
POLISARIO Front, as well as all the peoples of the region cannot
afford a protracted conflict. In an era of regional groupings and
globalization, those peoples are more willing than ever to achieve
their dream of a united, stable and prosper Maghreb.
The United Nations that assumes a particular responsibility
vis-à-vis the people of Western Sahara, including that of protecting
and preserving their natural resources, should spare no effort to do
them justice and to finally implement the international legitimacy
in Western Sahara, similarly to other regions in the world.
8-
.
While the composition of the United Nations evolves toward an
inclusive universality of peoples of all sizes that have
accomplished their national aspirations, especially through the
process of decolonization, Moroccan
unilateralism should not be encouraged at the expense of denying the
people of Western Sahara the inalienable right to self-determination.
. 9-
This new manipulative approach that the Moroccan party is using to
gain a renunciation by the international community of the basic
human right, i.e. the right of peoples to decide their fate, is
doomed to fail.
10.
-
Therefore, the unilateral, illegal and antidemocratic Moroccan
project of autonomy does not constitute obviously “the mutually
acceptable political solution which will provide for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”
called for by the international community and the Security Council.
It is even tantamount to betting on perpetuating the deadlock.
For its part, the POLISARIO Front, in keeping with the Security
Council position, is ready to work and cooperate with the United
Nations Secretary-General in order to achieve this mutually
acceptable political solution which will provide for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
February 2007 |
